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Kaufman: Discrimination Cases

DISCRIMINATION AND BUSINESS
REGULATION
PROFESSOR EILEEN KAUFMAN'
The cases discussed in this article cover a wide range of
topics ranging from age discrimination claims to the
constitutionality of a state law imposing sanctions on companies
'doing business with Burma, to a product liability claim against a
car manufacturer for failure to install an airbag, to a negligence
claim against a railroad for failure to install automatic gates at the
railroad crossing and finally, to the authority of the FDA to
regulate cigarettes. While these topics may appear entirely
unrelated, what unites them is the continuing struggle to resolve
assertions of power between the state and federal governments.
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
The United States Supreme Court decided two age
discrimination cases last term. The first, Kimel v. FloridaBoard of
Regents, 2 continues the exceedingly sharp five-to-four federalism
clash in the Court, a clash that Linda Greenhouse has dubbed "one
of the great divides in the Court's recent history.",3 The case
addresses the question of whether in passing the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, "ADEA", 4 Congress validly
abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.
Seven of the nine circuits to address this issue had decided that the
ADEA did validly override the states' Eleventh Amendment
Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.

B.A.,

Skidmore College, 1970; J.D., New York University, 1975; L.L.M., New York
University, 1992. Prior to serving as Vice Dean and Professor of Law at Touro
Law Center, Dean Kaufnan was a Managing Attorney at Westchester Legal
Services, Inc. Professor Kaufman is a Reporter for the New York Pattern Jury
Instructions. She has published primarily in the area of civil rights law.
2528 U.S. 62, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
3 Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Shields State From Lawsuits on Age Bias,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2000, at Al.
4 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et. seq (2000).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XI, which states in pertinent part "The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to a case between a state and a
citizen of another state." Id.
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immunity.
However, the Supreme Court disagreed. Justice
O'Connor, writing for the five-to-four majority,7 concluded that
Congress lacked the constitutional power to subject state
employers to age discrimination suits by private employees.8
The Court's analysis addressed two questions: first,
whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, 9 and second, if it did,
whether it was acting pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional
authority.10

The Court had little trouble concluding that Congress
manifested a clear intent to override the states' immunity."' When
originally enacted in 1967, the ADEA specifically excluded state
employers from coverage, 12 but that was changed in 1974, when
the statute was amended to expand the definition of "employer" to
include states and their political subdivisions or agencies and
instrumentalities.13 The statute was also amended to authorize a
civil action against a state employer. 14 The plain language of the

6Kimel, 120 S. Ct. 631, 639 (2000). The Supreme Court refers to eight circuits

that have addressed the issue of whether the ADEA overrides the states'
immunity. Seven of the circuits have held that the ADEA's abrogation of the
states rights is constitutional. Id. (citing Cooper v. New York State Office of
Mental Health, 162 F.3d 770 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding the validity of the
ADEA abrogating the states immunity). See also Scott v. University of
Mississippi, 148 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 1998); Coger v. Board of Regents, 154 F.3d
296 (6th Cir. 1998); Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
(7th Cir. 1998); Keeton v. University of Nevada System, 150 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir.
1998); Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 296 (10th Cir. 1998); Kimel v. Board of
Regents, 137 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998). But see Humenansky v. Regents of
the University of Minnesota, 152 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1998) (the, ADEA does not
abrogate the states" Eleventh Amendment immunity).
7 Id.
at 650.
8 Id. The Court notes that state employees may seek redress against state
employees via state age discrimination statutes. Id.
9

Id.

10

Id.
" Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 640. "[T]he plain language of these provisions clearly
demonstrates Congress' intent to subject the States to suit for money damages at
the hands of individual employees." Id.
" Id. at 637.
13id.
14id.
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statute thus clearly evidenced
5 Congress' intent to subject the States
to suit for money damages.'
The far :more difficult question in Kimel was whether
Congress had the constitutional power to override the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity and subject them to suit. The
Court had previously held, in EEOC v. Wyoming, that Congress
had the power to pass the ADEA pursuant to its Commerce Clause
power.' However, that does not answer the Eleventh Amendment
question because in 1996, in the landmark case of Seminole Tribe
v. Florida,17 the Court held that when Congress acts pursuant to its
Article I Commerce Clause power, it lacks the power to abrogate
the states' sovereign immunity.1 8 That holding was explicitly
reaffirmed by the Court last term in Kimel: "Congress' powers
under Article I of the Constitution do not include the power to
subject States to suit at the hands of private individuals."' Thus, if
the Commerce Clause is the only basis for Congress' enactment of
the ADEA, then Congress cannot validly authorize an age
discrimination suit brought by private individuals against their
2
state employers. 1)
The only constitutional basis for validly abrogating the
states' sovereign immunity is Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 1 Thus, the question becomes whether the ADEA is
appropriate legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
22
Amendment.
This question requires a consideration of City of Boerne v.
Flores,23 a case discussed at this conference a few years ago. In
Boerne, the Court provided an analyzed structure for
distinguishing remedial legislation under Section 5 from
unauthorized substantive redefinition of the Fourteenth
'"29
16

U.S.C. §§ 621 etseq.

EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983). The Court held that the

ADEA was constitutional, Id.
17517 U.S. 44 (1996).
sId.
at 47.
'9Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 640.
'oId.at 643.
21

22
23

Id. (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
521 U.S.507 (1997).
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Amendment.24 The test requires "congruence and proportionality
between the injury 2to5 be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end.",
What does this congruence and proportionality test mean,
how did the Court apply it to the ADEA and what does it bode for
the future?
Applying the Boerne test, the Court in Kimel concluded
that the requirements imposed under the ADEA on state employers
were "disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct that
conceivably could be targeted by the Act." 26 Under equal
protection analysis, age discrimination claims do not trigger any
form of heightened scrutiny. Rather they are analyzed under the
highly deferential rational basis review test.27 This is in sharp
contrast to the ADEA, where the use of age as a basis for an
employment decision is prima facie evidence of unlawful
discrimination. 28 So, the ADEA makes unlawful far more state
employment practices than would be found to be unconstitutional
under rational basis review. 29 The ADEA is "so out of proportion
to a supposed remedial or preventive object, so that it cannot be
understood as responsive
to, or designed to prevent,
30
unconstitutional behavior.9
Having found that the "ADEA prohibits very little conduct
likely to be held unconstitutional," the Court proceeded to
determine whether the Act was nevertheless an appropriate
24

Id. at 519. The Court explains that Congress has the power to enforce a given

constitutional right, Congress does not have the power to determine what

constitutes a violation of that right. Id.
25 Id. at 534. Under the "compelling interest" test States would be required
to
demonstrate that the methods used to achieve its interests are the least
restrictive. Id.
26 Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 645.
27 Id. at 645. The "rational basis" test merely requires that a State's actions be
related to an age based distinction. The correlation need not be shown to have
"razorlike precision." Id..
28 29 U.S.C. § 6231 (a)(1) (2000), stating in pertinent part, "It shall be unlawful

for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's

age." Id.
2
9Kimel,
30

id.

120 S. Ct. at 647.
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prophylactic or remedial measure to address a particularly
intractable problem. 3 1 The Court found that such a problem did
not exist.32 Congress had not identified a widespread pattern of
age discrimination by the states. 33 Congress was not acting on a
record of pervasive age discrimination practiced by the states.
Although there are snippets of evidence and anecdotes about age
discrimination by state agencies, the Court characterized the
problem as "inconsequential" and insufficient to support Congress'
expansion of the ADEA to the states. 34 Since Congress had no
basis to believe that "unconstitutional age discrimination had
become a problem of national import," it had no 3reason
to believe
5
necessary.
was
legislation
prophylactic
that broad,
Towards the end of the decision, the Court suggested that
plaintiffs with age discrimination claims were not without a
remedy due to the presence of state statutes prohibiting age
discrimination. For example, in New York, the Human Rights
36
Law at Section 296 prohibits age discrimination in employment.
However, it should be noted that the remedies offered are not
identical under the two statutes. For example, the federal statute
authorizes attorneys' fees, and attorneys' fees are not available
under New York State Human Rights Law. Another significant
difference relates, to damages. The federal age discrimination
statute authorizes 'double damages' for willful violations,
while a
37
similar remedy is not available under New York law.
Justice Stevens authored a vigorous dissent, joined by
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 3 8 This dissent does not
3'Id. at 639.
Id. at 649.

33Id. at 645. The Court has addressed unconstitutional age claims under the

Equal Protection Clause three times. In each case the Court determined that the
discrimination
was not prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
34

Kimel, 120 S. Ct at 645.
35 Id. "Old age also does not define a discrete and insular minority because all
?ersons, if they live out their normal life spans, will experience it." Id.
N.Y. EXEC LAW §3290 (1999), provides in pertinent part, "The legislature
hereby finds and declares that the state has the responsibility to act to assure that
every individual within this state is afforded an equal opportunity... to
eliminate and prevent discrimination in employment." Id.
50 Id. (The language of the statute does not make any provision for 'double
damages', even in ca;es of willful discrimination).
38 Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 650 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
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mince words. The dissenting Justices believe that the Court's39
recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is simply all wrong.
The dissent characterizes Seminole Tribe v. Florida as "so
profoundly mistaken and so fundamentally inconsistent with the
Framers' conception of the constitutional order that it has forsaken
any claim to the usual deference or respect owed to decisions of
this Court. ' 4° "The kind of judicial activism manifested in cases
like Seminole Tribe... represents such a radical departure from
the proper role of this Court that it should be opposed whenever
the opportunity arises. 4 1
This issue will be back before the Court this term in the
context of an ADA case. The Court has accepted Garrett v.
University of Alabama Birmingham Board of Trustees,42 a case
raising the same issue in the context of disability discrimination.
The Eleventh Circuit in Garrett,upheld the ADA as applied to the
states 43, as have the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit even
post-Kimel.44 This case is theoretically distinguishable from the
age discrimination case for at least two reasons. First, the record in
Garret is significantly stronger with respect to evidence of
discrimination on the basis of disability. 45 Second, it may be
argued that disability claims may warrant something more
searching than rational basis review. Whether those distinctions
39

Id. at 652-53, "The Eleventh Amendment simply does not support the Court's
view .... Thus, today's decision (relying as it does on Seminole Tribe) rests
entirely on a novel judicial interpretation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
which
the Court treats as though it were a constitutional precept." Id.
40
Id. at 650.
41

id.

Garrett v. University of Alabama Birmingham Board of Trustees, 193 F.3d
1214 (11th Cir. 1999).
43 Id.
44 See, e.g., Leiman v. New York, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13586 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding that plaintiffs claim that she was forced to retire from her job in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was barred by U.S.
Const. amend XI since the state did not explicitly waive its immunity from suit);
See also Howard v. Regents of University of California, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5074 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that defendant was entitled to summary judgement
due to Eleventh Amendment immunity from Age Discrimination in
Employment Act suit).
45 Garrett v. The Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama in
Birmingham, 989 F. Supp. 1409, 1410 (N.D. Ala. 1998).
42
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mean46the case will be decided differently from Kimel remains to be
seen.
The second age discrimination case of last term, Reeves v.
SandersonPlumbing Products,47 is very important because it helps
to clarify how one goes about proving a discrimination claim based
on indirect or circumstantial evidence.
The heart of an
employment discrimination claim is that the employer is treating
an employee less favorably because of the employee's membership
in a protected group. These claims require the plaintiff to prove
intentional discrimination by the employer, which can be done by
direct evidence or, far more commonly, by indirect or
circumstantial evidence.48 When the court analyzes an indirect
evidence case, it, uses a three-step analysis suggested by the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.49 First, the
plaintiff must establish a primafacie case of discrimination by his
or her employer. Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff makes out

As this article went to press, the Supreme Court decided University of
Alabama v. Garrett, holding that Congress did not have the power to override
the states' immunity with respect to the Americans with Disabilities Act. See
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955
46

(2001).
47 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000). Reeves filed suit contending that he had been fired
because of his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
Reeves was employed by defendant's manufacturing company for 40 years. He
worked in the "hinge room," where his responsibilities included recording the
attendance of those who worked on the "regular line" under his supervision. In
1995, the director of manufacturing reported to company officials that
production in the hinge room was falling due to absent and late employees.
Following an audit of the hinge room, Reeves was discharged and he filed suit
against Sanderson Plumbing Products Incorporated. Id.
4 Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2105 (citing Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711 (1983)). The Court recognized that the question facing the triers

of fact in discrimination cases with respect to liability is difficult, and that "there
will seldom be eyewitness testimony as to the employer's mental processes".
As a result the Court's have employed a framework articulated in McDonnell
Douglas to analyze ADEA claims that are primarily based on circumstantial
evidence. Id.
49 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Reeves, 120 S. Ct at 2106 (referring to McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (2000), establishing a systematic
approach for the burden of production and an order for the presentation of
proof). See also St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
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a prima facie case (which in this context means a rebuttable
presumption) by proving four elements:
1) that plaintiff is a member of a protected class;
2) that plaintiff applied for and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants;
3) that despite plaintiffs qualifications, plaintiff was
rejected; and
4) that the rejection occurred under circumstances that give
rise to an inference of discrimination, as when someone
from outside the protected group was hired or when the
position remained open and the employer continued to
50
interview persons who had the plaintiffs qualifications.
(The fact that the replacement is a member of the protected
class does not necessarily defeat the claim. However, in
age discrimination cases, modest age disparities are
obviously unlikely to suffice.)
Satisfying the above four criteria makes out aprimafaciecase.
Second, once the plaintiff makes out aprimafacie case, the
burden shifts to the employer who must come forward with a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's
rejection. 51 The employer's burden here is the burden of
production. The burden of persuasion remains at all times with the
plaintiff in a disparate treatment case.
Third, the employee then has the burden of demonstrating,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate reasons
articulated by the employer
were not its true reasons, but rather, a
52
discrimination.
pretext for
In Reeves, the question before the Court was whether in a
circumstantial evidence case, a plaintiffs prima facie case of
discrimination, coupled with sufficient evidence for a reasonable
fact finder to reject the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation
for its action, was adequate to sustain a finding of liability for
50
51

Id.
id.

Id. See Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2106. (stating that after the employer comes
forth with sufficient evidence to show that his decision to terminate the
employee was nondiscriminatory, the employee must be given an opportunity to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by
52

the employer was a mere pretext for discrimination and is not deserving of
belief).
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intentional discrimination. 53 Expressed differently, the issue is
whether plaintiff must do more than establish a prima facie case,
and prove that the employer's reason was false. 54 Is "pretext-plus"
required?
Roger Reeves was fifty-seven years old when he was fired
from a position as supervisor for a plumbing company where he
had worked for forty years. He had no trouble establishing a prima
facie case under the ADEA 55. He was a member of a "protected
group" since he was over forty years of age, he was qualified for
the position of supervisor, he was fired, and he was replaced by a
considerably younger person. 56
Having established a prima facie case, the burden of
production shifted -to his employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing him. 57 The employer claimed that
Reeves was fired, not because of his age, but rather he failed to
properly supervise the time records of his subordinates. 58 At trial,
Reeves testified that he had, in fact, accurately maintained the time
records. 59 The60 case went to the jury, who returned a verdict in
Reeves' favor.
Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2104-05. The Court granted certiorari, "to resolve a
conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to whether a plaintiff's primafacie case
of discrimination... combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable
53

factfmder to reject th e employer's nondiscriminatory explanation for its
decision, is adequate to sustain a finding of liability for intentional

discrimination." Id.
54 Id.

" Id.

See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2000). This provision states in pertinent part: "[I]t is

unlawful for an employer... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
age." Id.
individual's
56
Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2103.
17 Id. at 2103-05.
58 Id.

59 Id. at 2107. In response to Sanderson Plumbing's claim that Reeves failed to
properly supervise employees, Reeves established that Sanderson's explanation

was false, through evidence of his accuracy in maintaining attendance records
by showing that the automated time clock, in which the employees punched in,
often malfunctioned. Reeves also testified that his job description did not
include disciplining late employees. Moreover, Reeves stated that on occasions
where employees were paid for hours they did not work, the company simply
adjusted those employee's next paychecks to remedy the errors. Additionally,
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The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Reeves' prima
facie claim, coupled with evidence that the employer's reason was
false, was not sufficient to warrant a finding of unlawful
discrimination. 6 1
Rather, Reeves was required
to present
62
independent evidence of unlawful discrimination.
In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,63 the Court held that
the rejection by the fact finder of the employer's proffered
nondiscriminatory reason did not compel judgment for the
plaintiff. In other words, the plaintiff does not automatically win if
a fact finder determines that the employer was lying about the
reason for the adverse emplo6yment decision. 64 St. Mary's65 asked
the "must" question; Reeves asked the "may" question. In other
on the day Reeves was fired, he was told by his employer that his discharge was
due to his failure to report one absent employee on two separate days in
September, whereby on those days Reeves was in the hospital and not at work.
Reeves also introduced evidence that the head of Sanderson (Reeves' boss) had
directed derogatory, age based comments at Reeves. Id.
60 Id. at 2103. The jury found in favor of Reeves and awarded him $35,000 in
compensatory damages, and found that Sanderson's age discrimination had been
willful and the District Court entered judgment for $70,000. Id.
61 Reeves v Sanderson Plumbing Products, 180 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 1999).
62 Id. The reversal by the Court of Appeals was based on a finding Reeves had
not introduced enough evidence "to sustain the jury's finding of unlawful
discrimination." The court further noted that Reeves "very well may" have
introduced facts and evidence whereby a reasonable jury could have found that
Sanderson's proffered explanation for discharging Reeves was pretextual.
However, the court held that a prima facie case of discrimination, together with
sufficient evidence for the jury to disbelieve the employer's legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for discharge, was "not dispositive" of the main issue
of "whether Reeves presented sufficient evidence that his age motivated
Sanderson's employment decision." See Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2104.
63 St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
64 St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). Plaintiff brought suit
against his employer, St. Mary's, alleging intentional racial discrimination in
violation of § 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1). The district court found in favor of St. Mary's. The United
States Court of Appeals reversed holding that Hicks was entitled to judgement
as a matter of law upon proof that all of St. Mary's proffered reasons were
pretextual. The Supreme Court stressed that they do not have the authority to
subject an employer to liability for alleged discriminatory employment practices
unless determined by an appropriate factfimder that the employer has unlawfully
discriminated. Id.
65 St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
66 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000).
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words, may the fact finder conclude that it was unlawful
discrimination when it determines that the employer's articulated
reason was false'? The Court's unanimous answer, with Justice
O'Connor writing for the Court, was yes. 67 The Court employed a
common sense approach, noting that the most likely explanation
for an employer lying is that the employer is masking unlawful
discrimination. 68 The Court notes that it is quite reasonable for a
jury to infer "from the falsity of an employer's explanation that the
69
employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose."
Further, once you reject the employer's explanation,
"discrimination may well be the most likely alternative
in the best position to
explanation, especially since the employer ' is
7
put forth the actual reason for its decision. 0
Thus, the holding in Reeves is that "a plaintiff's primafacie
case, combined with sufficient evidence to allow the fact finder to
reject the employer's articulated reason as false, permits the trier of
71
fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.",
67

Id. at 2111-12. In determining whether Reeves was the victim of intentional

discrimination on the basis of his age, the Court examined the record in favor of
Reeves, and found that Reeves was required to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that his age was a determining factor in the decision of Sanderson to
terminate him. The district court instructed the jury that, to show that
Sanderson's explanation was a pretext for discrimination, Reeves had to offer
evidence to demonstrate, first, that the reasons stated by Sanderson were not the
real reasons for his discharge, and second, that age discrimination was the real
reason for his discharge. Since Reeves established a prima facie case of
discrimination, through sufficient evidence for the jury to reject Sanderson's
explanation, and since Reeves introduced additional evidence of animosity
based on his age, the Supreme Court over turned the verdict of the Court of
Appeals and held that there was sufficient evidence to find that Sanderson
intentionally discriminated, thus it was proper for the district court to submit the
case to the jury superior to the motion for judgement as a matter of law made by
Sanderson. Id.
68 See Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2109. "When all legitimate reasons for rejecting an
applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it
is more likely than not the employer, who we generally assume acts with some
reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration." hi.
69 Id. at 2108. (The Court noted that, such an inference by the jury, is consistent
with the principal of evidence law, that the finder of fact is permitted to consider
the dishonesty of a party as to a material fact as "affirmative evidence of guilt")
!iuoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992)).
Id. at 2108-09.
71Id. at 2109.
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However, this does not mean that such a showing will always be
adequate to support a jury finding of liability. 72 Where the
plaintiffs evidence of pretext is weak, where the evidence suggests
that the employer's explanation was a pretext for something other
than discrimination, and where there is abundant evidence that no
discrimination occurred, the employer would be entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.7 3
Reeves is a real victory for employment discrimination
claimants, and is not limited to age discrimination claims.74
Reeves provides the methodology whether it is race, age, sex or
disability discrimination. 75 Further, Reeves is likely to be followed
by state courts analyzing state law discrimination claims because
the courts follow the same methodology, order of proof,
presentation of proof and burdens as the federal court. 7 6 Thus, the
decision is likely to be applied in New York State under the New
York State Human Rights Law.7 7
PREEMPTION DECISIONS
The Court decided several preemption cases last term and
these decisions, surprisingly, do not fit the pattern that has
otherwise emerged in the last several years through interpretation
of the Tenth amendment, 78 the Eleventh Amendment, 79 and
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 80 The shift of power to
the states that emerged in the federalism cases was not the result in
the preemption cases of last term, where in each case the Court
found the state law to be preempted. In case after case, the Court
72

Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2109.

73 Id.
74 id.
75 Id.
76 id.

77 Id.
78

U.S. CONST. amend. X, states in pertinent part: "The powers not delegated to

the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited to it by the States, are
reserved are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." Id.
79 U.S. CONST. amend XI, states in pertinent part: "[t]he judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extended to a case between a state and a

citizen of another state." Id.
8
0 U.S. CONST. amend XIV § 5. This section provides that "Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation the provisions of this article". Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol17/iss1/26

12

Kaufman: Discrimination Cases

1997

DISCRIMINATION CASES

has said that the touchstone of preemption is congressional intent.
That intent may be manifested either expressly or impliedly.
Implied preemption occurs when Congress regulates so
pervasively that it is said to occupy the field, which is referred to
as field preemption 8 l Furthermore, implied preemption can also be
accomplished through conflict preemption, where it is impossible
to comply with both state and federal laws, or where the state law
frustrates the objectives of the federal law. 82 Once the Court
determines that Congress intended to preempt state action, the
Supremacy Clause instructs that the state law is invalid.
The most interesting of the preemption cases last term was
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council.83 This case involves
Burma, renamed Myanmar in 1989.
(The Supreme Court
explained that its use of the name Burma instead of Myanmar was
not meant to express any political view, 84 and I issue the same
disclaimer.) The issue in the case was the validity under the
Supremacy Clause of a state statute that imposed sanctions on
companies doing business with Burma.8 5 In 1996, Massachusetts
adopted a law that, subject to a few limited exceptions, imposed

29192 (1997). The Supreme Court will find field preemption if a federal regulation
shows the intentions of Congress that by enacting such a comprehensive federal
law such law will be exclusive in a particular area and completely occupy the
field. See also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). The Court
has stated that "[a]bsent explicit preemptive language, 'Congress' intent to
supercede state law altogether may be found from a scheme of federal regulation
so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
the States to supplement it." Id.
" CHEMERINSKY, sUpra note 102, at 297-98. A person cannot comply with both
federal and state law at the same time since federal law and state law is mutually
exclusive. If the two laws are in conflict, state law is preempted by state law.
Id.
81 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLE AND POLICIES

83

84

120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000).

Id. at 2291 n.1. The Court stated:
The Court of Appeals noted that the ruling military government of "Burma
changed [the country's] name to Myanmar in 1989," but the court then said it
would use the name Burma since both parties and amici curiae, the state law,
and the federal law all do so... We follow suit, noting that our use of this term,
like the First Circuit's, is not intended to express any political view.
Id.
85 Id. at 2291.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000

13

Touro Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 [2000], Art. 26

262

TOURO L4WREVIEW

[Vol 17

such sanctions.8 6 Besides Massachusetts, Vermont was the only
state to adopt this type of law, but there were nineteen
that adopted a Burma law, including New York
municipalities
87
City.
Three months after the Massachusetts law was passed,
Congress passed the Burma Act, imposing its own set of sanctions
on Burma.88 The National Foreign Trade Counsel, consisting of
members with business ties to Burma, challenged the
Massachusetts law.89 The federal district court invalidated the law
and the First Circuit affirmed, on three independent grounds: 1)
that the state law interfered with the foreign affairs power of the
national government, 2) that the law violated the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause, and 3) that the state law was preempted by the
"
federal Burma Act.9
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the
Massachusetts law was preempted by the Federal Burma Law,
because the state law stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment
of Congress' objectives under the federal Act. 91 However, the
Court did not reach the foreign affairs question or the dormant
commerce clause issue. 92 Writing for the Court, Justice Souter
concluded that that the state law conflicted with the federal law
because it frustrated the purposes of three provisions of the Burma
Law: first its delegation of discretion to the President to control
economic sanctions against Burma; second, its limitation of
sanctions solely to United States persons and new investment; and
third, its directive to the President to proceed diplomatically in
developing a comprehensive, multilateral strategy towards
93
Burma.
With respect to Presidential discretion, the Court noted that
when Congress gives the President direct authority to act in foreign
8

6 MASS GEN LAWS

§ 7:226- 7:22 (1997).

" Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2293.

Foreign Operations, Exporting, Financing and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1997 §570, 110 Stat 3009-166 to 3009-167.
89 Crosby, 120 S.Ct. at 2293.
90 Natsios, 181 F.3d at 43.
91 Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2293.
92 Id.at 2294.
93Id.
at 2293.
88

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol17/iss1/26
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affairs, the President's authority is at its maximum. 94 The Court
stated "the statute has placed the President in a position with as
much discretion to exercise economic leverage against Burma,
with an eye toward national security, as our law will admit. And it
is just this plenitude of executive authority that we think controls
the issue of preemption here." 95 The Massachusetts law, by
imposing unconditional, immediate and automatic sanctions on
Burma thus undermines the more nuanced approach utilized in the
federal law that gives the President some discretion with respect to
imposing or withholding full sanctions. According to the Court,
the Massachusetts law, if enforced, would tie the President's hands
and he would have less economic and diplomatic leverage in
dealing with Burma 96 Further, the Massachusetts law would
prevent the President from speaking for the country with one
unified voice and. would impede his ability to develop a
comprehensive strategy to bring democracy to Burma and improve
human rights practices there.97
The Court's finding was
strengthened by the reaction of some of our allies who filed
formal
98
protests against Massachusetts' adoption its Burma law.
Defenders of the Massachusetts law argued that there is no
conflict preemption because the two laws have the same purpose:
to bring democracy to Burma and prevent human rights abuses.
The defenders also argued that Congress knew about the
Massachusetts law when it passed its Burma Law, yet failed to
expressly preempt the state law.99 Finally, the defenders pointed to
the boycott measures that were enacted by localities and the states
in the South Africa apartheid era, °0 arguing that those laws should
serve as a precedent. The Court, however, rejected all of these
arguments.'1l The fact that the state law and the federal law share
94 Id. at

2295.

9'Id. at 2296.

% Id.
97 Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2298.
98 Id.

at 2299. For example, the European Union warned that the Massachusetts
law would have a damaging effect on bilateral European Union and United
States relations. Japan went so far as to file a formal complaint in the World
Trade Organization. Id.
" Id.
'0oCrosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2302.
1o1 Id.
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a common purpose, does not remove the conflict in the means
employed by the two laws. 1°2 The fact that there were local
sanctions against South Africa does not serve as a precedent
because the Supreme Court never had the opportunity to rule on
0 3
whether those laws were preempted.1
In reading this case, one may well question why Congress
is not required to expressly articulate its intent to preempt?. If
Congress has the power to preempt, why not simply require
Congress to expressly announce that intent, or, at least, utilize a
presumption against preemption? In a footnote, the Court simply
stated "We leave for another day a consideration.., of a
presumption against preemption."'04 Some years ago, a bill was
introduced in both houses of Congress prescribing there would be
no preemption of state or local law if Congress did not expressly
state its intent to preempt, r unless there was a direct conflict
between the two. ° 5 As far as I know, there has been little
movement to secure passage of such a bill.
There is a concurrence in the case written by Justice Scalia
and joined by Justice Thomas. They write to chastise their
colleagues for unnecessarily relying on legislative history. Scalia
states:
Neither the statements of individual Members of
Congress (ordinarily addressed to a virtually empty
floor), nor Executive statements and letters
addressed to congressional committees, nor the nonenactment of other proposed legislation, is a reliable
indication of what a majority of both Houses of
Congress intended when they voted for the statute
before us.1 ....The only reliable indication of
that intent - the only thing we know for sure can be
attributed to all of them - is the words of the bill
that they voted to make law. In a way, using
unreliable legislative history to confirm what the
statute plainly says anyway ...is less objectionable
102id.
103Id.

'04Id.at 2294 n.8.
105Id.
106
Id. at 2302 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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since, after all, it has absolutely no effect upon the
outcome. But in a way, this utter lack of necessity
makes it even worse - calling to mind St.
Augustine's enormous remorse at stealing pears
when he was not even hungry, and just for the devil
of it not seeking
aught through the shame, but the
07
1
itselP'
shame
What is the effect of this decision on other local sanction
laws? The decision in the Burma case was targeted at rather
specific conflicts between two laws that utilized very different
approaches. The decision is targeted at rather specific conflicts
between two laws that utilize very different approaches. It did not
announce any broad prohibition against states or localities
venturing into the foreign policy domain, which means that it is
conceivable that, in other contexts, other boycott measures may
survive.
08
The railroad case, Norfolk Southern Railway v. Shanklin,'
is another preemption case. In a seven-to-two opinion, the Court
held that a railroad could not be sued for negligence where a state
has used federal money to install a federally approved warning
10 9
device at a railroad crossing.
The next preemption case Geier v. American Honda Motor
0
Co.,"1 asks whether a federal law preempted a design defect claim
brought by a motorist who sustained serious injuries when her
1987 Honda Accord, which was equipped with a seat belt but not
an airbag, spun out of control and hit a tree.'
Many state courts,
including New York in Drattel v. Toyota Motor Corp."2 had
permitted the product liability claim to proceed, finding no
preemption. 1 3 At least five federal courts of appeals had reached
'07 Id. at 2304 (Scalia, J., concurring).

'0S 529 U.S.344 (2000).
109 Id.

120 S. Ct. 1913 (2000).
at 1917.
"2 Drattel v. Toyota Motor Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 35, 699 N.E.2d 376, 677 N.Y.S.2d
17 (1998).
113 See, Minton v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 80 Ohio St. 3d 62, 684
N.E.2d
648 (1997); Munroe v. Galati, 189 Ariz. 113, 938 P.2d 1114 (1997); Wilson v.
10

".Id.
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the contrary conclusion.1 4 At least five Circuit Courts of Appeals
5
have reached the opposite conclusion."
The Supreme Court, with Justice Breyer writing for a
sharply divided court, found that an automobile manufacturer
cannot be sued for negligence or strict products liability for failing
to have an airbag before federal law required all cars to have
airbags. 1 6 The Court found the tort claim was preempted by a
regulation promulgated by the Department of Transportation
17
pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.
The statute had an express saving clause that said it should not be
applied to preempt a state law tort action.'18 But this did not
prevent the Court.from conducting a conflict preemption analysis.
The Court said that the design defect claim, the tort claim, conflicts
with a federal regulation regarding passive restraints. 119 The
regulation first mandated manual seatbelts. Once it became clear
that people were not using mandatory seat belts, the government
began exploring passive restraints. 120 A series of regulations were
issued over the years about different kinds of passive restraint
systems.
Finally in 1984, the regulation at issue in this case was
passed, which was a phased-in requirement - not of air bags - but
of some form of passive restraint. It could be an automatic seat
belt, air bags or some other developing technology that would be
considered a passive restraint. The regulation was made effective
Pleasant, 660 N.E.2d 327 (Ind. App. 1995); Tebbetts v. Ford Motor Co., 140

N.H. 203, 665 A.2d 345 (1995).
"4See, e.g. Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir. 1997); Montag v.
Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir. 1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co.,
902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir. 1990); Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816

(11 th Cir. 1989); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (!st Cir. 1988).
"1 See, e.g. Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir. 1997); Montag
v.
Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir. 1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co.,

902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir. 1990); Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816
(I th Cir. 1989); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1988).
116Geier, 120 S. Ct. at 1927-8.
117 Id.
118Id. at 1919. The saving clause stated: "compliance with a federal safety
standard
does not exempt any person from any liability under common law." Id.
" 9 Id. at 1922.
120

15 U.S.C. § 1381 (1966) (repealed 1994).

121id.
122Geier,

120 S. Ct. at 1924.
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in model year 1987, but in that year the manufacturers only had to
comply with it in ten percent of their cars.
Honda, who was the defendant in this case, did comply
with that requirement, but the car that Mrs. Geier was driving was
not one of those ten percent. 23 Her car had a seat belt, not an air
bag nor any other orm of passive restraint. 124 The question raised
was whether her design defect claim against Honda was preempted
by the regulation. The Court held that the claim was preempted,
because the tort claim would stand as an obstacle to the variety and
mix of devices that the federal regulations sought.' 25 The Court
said the federal government had purposefully and deliberately
opted for a phased-in requirement that permitted a choice of
different passive restraint systems. 126 The federal government
decided that doing; this over time was important to slowly bring
about public acceptance, and to permit time to collect data about
the efficiency of different restraint systems.' 27 According to the
majority, the imposition of tort liability would conflict with the
federal objectives.
Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, and joined by Justices
Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg, characterized the majority holding
12
as an "unprecedented extension of the doctrine of preemption."' 8
Justice Stevens says "this is a case about federalism, that is, about
respect for the constitutional role of the States as sovereign
entities."' 29 The dissenters concluded that the federal objectives
"would not be frustrated one whit by allowing state courts to
determine whether in 1987 the life-saving advantages of airbags
had become sufficiently obvious that their
omission might
30
cars."'
new
some
in
defect
design
constitute a
The last case to be discussed, FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.,'3 1 its not a preemption case, but it is similar to the
preemption cases, in that it too turns on congressional intent. Also,
23

Id. at 1930.

12AId.

'25 Id. at 1928.
126Geier, 120 S. Ct. at
127

1916.

id.

128Id. at 1928 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129 .d. (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
30

31

706, 713 (1999)).

Id. at 1930.
529 U.S. 120, 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000). •
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like Geier above, this case plays out against the backdrop of a
private powerful industry lobbying vigorously against government
regulation. Here it is not the automobile manufacturers, it is the
tobacco industry. The tobacco industry won a clear victory in FDA
v. Brown, 132 where the Court held that the FDA lacked the
authority to regulate tobacco products. 133 Whether the tobacco
industry winds up winning the war and not just this particular
battle is far from clear.
The key event took place in 1996, when the FDA reversed
a ten year-old policy and announced that it did in fact have the
authority to regulate tobacco products.134 With Dr. David Kessler,
now Dean of Yale Medical School, as Commissioner, the agency
determined that nicotine was a drug within the meaning of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and cigarettes are combination
products that deliver nicotine to the body. 135 Pursuant to its
authority to regulate drugs and drug delivery devices, the agency
promulgated a series of restrictions that were targeted at
advertising and marketing practices aimed at young people,' 36 in
the hope of reducing tobacco addiction among children and
adolescents. The agency believed that the best way to deal with
the problem was to try to prevent sales to people under eighteen,
because that is when the addiction starts. 137 The regulations
restricted the sale, distribution and advertising of tobacco products
to young people, 3 8 as for example, prohibiting sales to persons
under eighteen, requiring photo identification, prohibiting free
samples, prohibiting vending machines except in adult-only
locations, restricting advertising to black and white text only
format unless the advertisement only reaches adults, prohibiting
outdoor advertising near a school or playground, and prohibiting
manufacturers from sponsoring certain athletic and cultural events.

13 529
13 3

U.S. 120, 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).

Id. at 1316.

134 Id. at 1296.
131 FDA,

120 S. Ct. at 1297.

136
id.
137 Id.
138 id.
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The regulations were challenged and with Justice
O'Connor writing for a five-to-four majority,139 the Court held that
the FDA lacked that authority to regulate tobacco. 140 The Court
was very blunt in acknowledging that smoking is a serious public
health hazard.'14 The majority was also blunt in its recognition of
the special status that the tobacco industry has in this country. The
Supreme Court, with Justice O'Connor writing for yet another
five-to-four majority, acknowledged that "this is hardly an
ordinary case . . . [it] invovle[s] an industry constituting a
significant portion of the American economy... [which holds] a
unique place in American history and society, tobacco has its own
unique political history."
e Court reviewed the decades of
congressional action and noted that on at least six different
143
occasions, Congress legislated in the area of tobacco products.
Congress legislated with respect to advertising tobacco and
labeling tobacco, but stopped short of banning the product. The
Court interpreted this history as evidencing Congress' intent not to
ban cigarette products. 144 "For better or worse" the Court said,
"Congress has created a distinct regulatory scheme for tobacco
products rejecting proposals to give the
FDA or any other agency
145
significant policy-making authority."'

Justice O'Connor, delivered the decision of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C.J.,
Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, JJ. joined.
40
' FDA, 120 S.Ct. at 1296.
1
14
id.
2
41Id. at 1315.
143
Id at 1295. Since 1965, Congress has enacted six separate statutes addressing
the problems of tobacco use. These statutes are: 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1333 and
4402, (which require that health warnings appear on all packaging and in all
print and outdoor advertisements); §§ 1335, 4402(0, (which prohibit the
139

advertising of tobacco products through any electronic communication medium
regulated by the Federal Communications Commission); 42 U.S.C.
§ 290aa-2(b)(2), (requiring the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
report every three years to Congress on research findings concerning the
addictive property of tobacco); and § 300x-26(a)(1), (making States' receipt of
certain federal block grants contingent on their prohibiting any tobacco product
manufacturer, retailer, or distributor from selling or distributing any such
?I
roduct to individuals under age 18). Id.
44FDA, 120 S.Ct. at

1295.

145Id.
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One interesting argument made in the case relates to the
FDA's power to determine whether a drug is safe. Since 1996, the
FDA has determined that tobacco products are not safe. According
to the majority, that means the FDA has to ban cigarettes from the
market, yet the FDA has not issued a ban. 146 Thus, according to
the majority the FDA's action
is not consistent with its charge
47
1
statutes.
relevant
under the
148
There is a dissent in the case authored by Justice Breyer,
who concludes that since the legislative record is unclear, the
Court should utilize traditional administrative law rules of
construction. These rules of construction require deference to the
agency. The dissent says:
... the upshot is that the Court today holds that a regulatory
statute aimed at unsafe drugs and devices does not authorize
regulation of a drug (nicotine) and a device (a cigarette) that the
Court itself finds unsafe. Far more than most, this particular drug
and device risks the life-threatening harms that administrative
regulation seeks to rectify.
The majority's conclusion is
counterintuitive. 149
The decision is unlikely to be the last word on the subject.
Dr. David Kessler was quoted as indicating that in some ways the
decision advances the cause because of its recognition of the
dangers caused by cigarettes. 150 President Clinton called on
Congress to explicitly give the FDA authority to regulate tobacco
products.'15 Presidential candidate Al Gore took a similar position.
On May 7 th then presidential candidate, George W. Bush said that
Congress 52
ought to give the FDA authority to discourage teenage
smoking.'
4Id.

See, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.
149 Justice BREYER, probably the Justice with the most background in
administrative law, delivered the dissent of the court, with whom Justice
STEVENS, Justice SOUTER, and Justice GINSBURG join.
'49 FDA, 120 S. Ct. at 1331.
130 Linda Greenhouse, High Court Holds F.D.A. Can't hnpose Rules on
Tobacco, N.Y. TIMEs, March 22, 2000 at Al.
151h.
52 Al Cross, Bushes Get Southern Welcome: Texas Governor, ex-president visit
147

the Derby, The Courier (Kentucky), May 7, 2000 at lb.
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